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Got a Better Idea?: Promoting
Greenhouse Gas Regulations Through
Solution-Based Informal Rulemaking
ABSTRACT
In September 2013, the US Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) proposed a rule regulating greenhouse gas emissions from newly
constructed, coal-fired power plants. Coal industry lawyers
immediately began preparing for litigation. Like many industry-led
arbitrary and capricious challenges, their goal is to stop the
regulations from moving forward. This Note analyzes the new rule,
concluding that although the EPA's rule is legally sound, it does have
some potential weaknesses. Rather than merely blocking the
regulations through litigation, however, this Note proposes that interest
groups should instead submit their own solutions during the
notice-and-comment rulemaking process, which would reduce
regulatory gridlock and encourage meaningful debate.
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Anthropogenic climate change is an alarming scientific fact.1
Greenhouse gases, most notably carbon dioxide, are causing global
temperatures to rise at an unprecedented rate.2 The largest sources
of domestic emissions are coal-fired power plants.3 They released
1,722.7 million metric tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere in
2011 alone,4 accounting for over a quarter of annual US greenhouse
gas emissions.5 In the June 25, 2013 speech introducing his Climate
Action Plan, President Barack Obama directed the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to promulgate standards for new and
existing power plants under the statutory authority of the Clean Air
Act (CAA). 6 Three months later, the EPA proposed its first rule under
this call to action-"the New Source Rule"-the first major greenhouse
1. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, UNITED STATES CLIMATE ACTION REPORT 2014, at 6,
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/219038.pdf ("The most significant
long-term environmental challenge facing the United States and the world is climate change that
results from anthropogenic emissions of [greenhouse gases]."); see also John Cook et al.,
Quantifying the Consensus on Anthropogenic Global Warming in the Scientific Literature, 8
ENvTL. RES. LETTERS, no. 2, 2013, at 3, available at http://iopscience.iop.org/1748-
9326/8/2/024024/pdf/1748-9326_8_2024024.pdf (concluding that 97.1 percent of peer-reviewed
scientific literature endorsed the consensus that climate change is occurring due to human
consumption); Scientific Consensus on Global Warming, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
http://www.ucsusa.org/global-warming/science-andimpacts/science/scientific-consensus-on.htm
(last updated Mar. 7, 2011) (listing links to documents attesting to the scientific community's
consensus that climate change is real and is caused by humans).
2. See Causes of Climate Change, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/causes.html (last updated Mar. 18, 2014). Greenhouse
gases contribute to climate change by absorbing and trapping heat in the atmosphere. Buildup of
these gases causes the planet to warm, causing dangerous effects on the climate, human health,
and ecosystems. See, e.g., Climate Change: Basic Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechangelbasics/ (last updated Mar. 18, 2014). The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change has identified six greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide,
methane, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulphur hexafluoride. See Frequently Asked
Questions, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.ipcc-
nggip.iges.or.jp/faq/faq.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2014).
3. See Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources.html (last updated Aug. 20, 2014).
4. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 430-R-13-001, INVENTORY OF U.S.
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990-2011, at 3-6 tbl.3-5 (2013), available at
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissionsUS-GHG-Inventory-2013-Main-
Text.pdf.
5. See Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, supra note 3.
6. See President Barack Obama, Remarks on Climate Change at Georgetown
University (June 25, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/06/25/remarks-president-climate-change).
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gas regulation affecting stationary sources.7 The New Source Rule
identifies two types of technology to achieve the standard: fuel plants
with new generation technologies (primarily natural gas), or adopt
costly carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technology.8
Environmental legislation and regulations have prompted
technological innovation in the past,9 but not without vehement
litigation or other delay tactics from resistant interest groups.0 The
coal industry-forced to choose between expensive CCS installation or
surrendering to a natural gas takeover of the US electricity
sector-already plans to sue the EPA." The industry will claim that
the agency has reached an arbitrary and capricious decision for failing
to address the required statutory factors, including costs and whether
the technology is "achievable" and "adequately demonstrated."12 With
only a handful of domestic CCS projects currently underway, some of
which face myriad budget issues, the rule is susceptible to such a line
of attack.13
The EPA's experts have evaluated scientific studies and
modeled predictions to determine that CCS is the best system for
coal-fired facilities to achieve significant carbon emission reductions.'4
7. See Jean Chemnick, EPA's New Carbon Rule Sparks Battle Over CCS, Legal
Challenges Likely, GREENWIRE (Sept. 22, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2013/09/20/
stories/1059987620.
8. See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Stationary
Sources: Electricity Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 1429, at § I.A.2 (proposed Jan. 8, 2014)
[hereinafter Standards of Performance].
9. An early example of technology-forcing environmental legislation occurred after the
Cuyahoga River fire of 1967, which was caused by extreme water pollution. Congress passed the
Clean Water Act in 1972, forcing polluters to adopt various forms of water treatment technology.
See Mark J. Kovasity, The Cuyahoga River Fire, ENVIROMENTOR 14 (2013), available at
http://www.asse.org/assets/1/7[MarkKovasityArticle.pdf.
10. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Train, 513 F.2d 506, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Essex
Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also Jean Chemnick, More
Questions Raised About EPA Process for New Power Plant Rule, GREENWIRE (Feb. 4, 2013),
http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2014/02/04/stories/1059993974 (explaining that industry
interests may pursue procedure-based strategies, either through litigation or alleging that the
EPA has violated the Data Quality Act).
11. See Chemnick, supra note 7 (quoting a utility company attorney, who stated that
the chance of litigation over the rule is at "100 percent").
12. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2012). The industry will likely also argue that the EPA has
exceeded its statutory authority by forcing technology without properly considering costs or
achievability. Because arbitrary and capricious challenges frequently hinge on whether the
agency has adequately considered statutorily required factors, this Note focuses on the coal
industry's probable arbitrary and capricious challenge. See, e.g., Nat'l Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 233
F.3d 625, 640 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding regulation despite industry's argument that the EPA
did not adequately consider costs); Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1286, 1304 (9th Cir. 1977)
(holding that an EPA regulation was arbitrary and capricious because the technology was not
adequately demonstrated and the costs were too high).
13. See Chemnick, supra note 7.
14. See Standards of Performance, supra note 8, at § I.B.5.
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Trade groups, on the other hand, will assuredly present conflicting
data to argue that CCS is exorbitantly costly and not technologically
feasible.15 This Note argues that despite the rule's weaknesses, the
EPA has adequately justified its new standard and therefore it will
likely withstand the arbitrary and capricious standard of review.16
Nonetheless, the ease with which opposed interest groups can delay
agencies' solutions demonstrates a larger problem with the
adversarial nature of today's informal rulemaking procedures. To
address the current regulatory impasse between regulator and
regulated entity, this Note also proposes a new process for interest
groups to more effectively engage in rulemaking and reduce
regulatory gridlock-asking parties to offer their own solutions
through a modified informal rulemaking procedure, or "solution-based
informal rulemaking."17
Part I discusses the framework and history of the New Source
Performance Standards (NSPS) provision of the CAA, the arbitrary
and capricious standard of review, and the details of the proposed New
Source Rule. Part II analyzes the Rule in light of the factors named in
the CAA, and argues that despite cost and technology challenges
surrounding CCS, the agency has provided reasonable and adequate
justifications. Although the New Source Rule should withstand an
arbitrary and capricious challenge, it does not save the EPA or other
agencies from defending against future litigation or delay tactics. To
remedy this problem, Part III proposes that interested parties should
offer their own solutions to the regulatory problem during a modified
notice-and-comment period, rather than merely litigating after a rule
has been finalized. The coal industry believes CCS is an unworkable
proposal, but if forced to weigh the same factors as the EPA, could
they come up with a better solution?
I. THE LITIGATION BACKDROP: THE EPA's CAA AUTHORITY, THE
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND THE NEW
SOURCE RULE
The EPA is no stranger to the courtroom; regulated entities,
environmental groups, or both challenge nearly every regulation it
promulgates.18 The Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions From New Stationary Sources: Electricity Generating Units
15. See discussion infra Part II.
16. See discussion infra Part II.
17. See discussion infra Part III.
18. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Appalachia Power Co. v. EPA,
135 F.3d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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(the New Source Rule) will be no exception.19 Although the EPA has
authority to issue greenhouse gas regulations for stationary sources
under the CAA, Section 111(b), industry groups will challenge the
EPA's interpretation of the "Standard of Performance" definition.20
The industry will argue that the EPA's decision was arbitrary and
capricious, but with an abundance of case law permitting the EPA to
base its rules on reasonable predictions, a reviewing court should hold
in favor of the agency.21
A. The EPA's CAA Authority to Regulate Greenhouse Gases
The CAA was originally enacted in 1963, but the rising
environmental movement of the late sixties and seventies spurred a
1970 amendment that established the NSPS provision.22 The statute
itself, its legislative history, case law, and the EPA's website all reveal
that technological innovation was one of the central purposes of the
1970 amendment.23 The new section directed the EPA to regulate air
pollutants that were "requisite to protect the public health."24 As a
natural element of the atmosphere, carbon dioxide was not originally
considered harmful to public health. Thus, after the initial
amendment, the EPA could not regulate carbon emitters such as
power plants under Section 111.25 But in the landmark case
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court held that greenhouse gas
emissions meet the CAA definition of "air pollutant."26  There,
environmental groups argued that because carbon dioxide contributes
to global warming, the EPA was required to regulate carbon
19. See Chemnick, supra note 7.
20. See Clean Air Act §111(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)-(b) (2012).
21. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
22. See generally Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C §§ 7401-7626 (2012).
23. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(2), (4) (stating that two of the statute's purposes are "to
initiate and accelerate a national research and development program to achieve the prevention
and control of air pollution" and "to encourage and assist the development and operation of
regional air pollution prevention and control programs."); Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d
901, 909 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[One of] the basic goals of the 1977 Amendments [was] technology-
forcing. The legislative history suggests and courts have recognized that in passing the Clean Air
Act Amendments, Congress intended to stimulate the advancement of pollution control
technology."); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Progress Cleaning the Air
and Improving People's Health, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/air/caa/
progress.html#clean (last updated Apr. 22, 2014) (listing eleven different technologies developed
as a result of CAA regulations); see also Forcing Technology: The Clean Air Act Experience, 88
YALE L.J. 1713, 1714 (1979).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
25. See John M. Broder, E.P.A. Expected to Regulate Carbon Dioxide, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
18, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/19/science/earth/19epa.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
26. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 506 (2007); 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
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emissions.27 The CAA mandates the EPA to regulate emissions
that "endanger public health or welfare," 28 which includes "effects
on ... weather and ... climate."2 9  The Supreme Court noted that
carbon dioxide "fit[s] well within the Clean Air Act's capacious
definition of 'air pollutant"' and remanded the case.30 Upon remand,
the EPA found that six greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide,
threatened public health and subsequently signed an Endangerment
Finding, a prerequisite to regulating carbon emissions.31
The EPA's authority to regulate new sources of pollution
derives from the CAA, Section 111(b), which requires the EPA to
establish technology-based standards for new air pollution sources.32
In setting the NSPS, the EPA must consult its experts to determine
what technology is the "best system of emission reduction" (BSER).33
This term is defined at Section 111(a)(1), and requires the
Administrator to consider "the cost of achieving such reduction,"
"nonair quality health and environmental impact[s]," and "energy
requirements."34 The Administrator must also determine that the
technology is "achievable" and "has been adequately demonstrated."35
The US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia case law further
dictates that the EPA must consider the amount of air pollution
reduction and whether the regulation forces technological
innovation.36 Because the EPA has identified CCS as the BSER for
27. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 510.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h).
30. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532. The CAA defines "air pollutant" as "any air
pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological,
radioactive (including source material, special nuclear material, and byproduct material)
substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air." 42 U.S.C. §
7602(g).
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A); Broder, supra note 25. Massachusetts v. EPA was
based on the CAA, Section 202(a)(1), which governs mobile sources (i.e., motor vehicles). The
Endangerment Finding, however, automatically triggered other CAA programs according to
long-standing agency interpretation. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for
Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment/ (last updated Nov. 22, 2013).
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411; see also DAVID R. WOOLEY & ELIZABETH M. MORSS, CLEAN AIR
ACT HANDBOOK § 4:1 (2014).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("[W~e can think of no
sensible interpretation of the statutory words 'best technological system' which would not
incorporate the amount of air pollution as a relevant factor to be weighed when determining the
optimal standard for controlling . . . emissions."); id. at 346 ("Our interpretation of section 111(a)
is that the mandated balancing of cost, energy, and nonair quality health and environmental
factors embraces consideration of technological innovation as part of that balance.")
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coal-fired power plants, the coal industry will likely argue CCS is
prohibitively expensive, not achievable, and not "adequately
demonstrated."3
There is no bright line number for the EPA to rely on for cost
consideration. The D.C. Circuit has forbidden price tags that are
"exorbitantly costly," 38 "greater than the industry could bear and
survive," 39 or "excessive."40 The reviewing court considers not only the
costs of installation and maintenance, but also whether the costs
would be passed on to consumers and how much those prices would
increase.41 But the CAA does not require a rigid cost-benefit analysis,
due partially to the extreme difficulty in quantifying benefits of
improved air quality.42 Rather, as long as the EPA has engaged in a
reasoned consideration of costs, the rule will be upheld.4 3
The standard of performance definition is also limited to
standards that are "achievable" through the BSER that "the
Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated."44
These terms were at issue in Portland Cement v. Ruckelshaus, and the
court held in favor of the EPA.4 5 By equating achievability with
"technological feasibility," the court granted the EPA significant
deference in interpreting feasibility.4 6 Because Section 111(b) looks to
the future-it regulates all new sources of air pollution after all-the
agency "may make a projection based on existing technology, though
that projection is subject to the restraints of reasonableness and
cannot be based on a 'crystal ball' inquiry."4 7 In other words, if the
EPA reasonably predicts that the technology will be more widely
available in the future based on the current state of technology, then
the agency has shown that the technology is "achievable."48 Later
cases have continued to hold that technology-based standards are
37. See Chemnick, supra note 7.
38. Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lignite
Energy Council v. EPA, 198 F.3d 930, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
39. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Train, 513 F.2d 506, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
40. Costle, 657 F.2d at 343.
41. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 387-88 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (superseded by statute on other issues); Costle, 657 F.2d at 313.
42. See Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 387.
43. See Essex Chem., 486 F.2d at 438 (citing Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 387).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2012).
45. See 486 F.2d at 390.
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achievable if the technology is reasonably projected to be available to
new sources at the time of their construction.49
The EPA's standard does not have to be continuously
achievable by every single regulated entity, which both the legislative
history of the CAA's 1970 Amendments and case law make clear.0
For instance, another early Section 111 case, Essex Chemical Corp. v.
Ruckelshaus, upheld a standard as "achievable" despite test data that
seemingly suggested otherwise.1 During testing, the plant
challenging the regulation was only able to achieve emissions levels
below or at the standard on three occasions, and emitted above the
standard sixteen times.52 The fact that the plant had achieved the
standard at least a few times was sufficient for the court to deem the
standard "achievable" and "adequately demonstrated."53
Finally, the EPA may tailor its regulations based on industry
trends and future projections.54 In Portland Cement v. EPA, the EPA
set an NSPS for modified stationary sources, but the regulated
industry argued that the standard was arbitrary and capricious
because the EPA had not adequately considered the effect of the rule
on older facilities.55 The EPA did, in fact, tailor the rule to newer
facilities, because industry data and predictions showed that a
majority of companies were shutting down older facilities rather than
retrofitting them with newer technology.5 6 The court permitted the
agency to focus primarily on newer facilities based on that data, and
held that the rule was not arbitrary and capricious.57 These cases
demonstrate that the EPA may make reasonable predictions while
considering the CAA's limiting factors on BSERs.
B. The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard of Review
According to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Section
706, a reviewing court shall set aside any agency action deemed
49. See, e.g., Lignite Energy Council v. EPA, 198 F.3d 930, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per
curiam); Nat'1 Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Train, 539 F.2d 775, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
50. See, e.g., S. Rep. 91-1116, at 16 (1970), available at http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/
ZyPDF.cgi/20016BLI.PDF?Dockey=20016BLI.PDF ("Major new facilities such as electric
generating plants . . . must be controlled to the maximum practicable degree regardless of their
location and industrial operations.") (emphasis added); Essex Chem., 486 F.2d at 427.
51. See Essex Chem., 486 F.2d at 440.
52. Id. at 437.
53. See id. at 440.






arbitrary or capricious.58 A court may determine an agency's decision
is arbitrary and capricious if it has:
[R]elied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that
runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
5 9
In other words, if a statute instructs an agency to consider a specific
factor-costs, for instance-but the agency fails to consider it or
provides insufficient data to support its conclusion, a reviewing court
should set aside the action as unlawful.60
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. requires agencies to adequately explain
their underlying rationale for a regulation, but their expertise is
accorded significant deference, partially because agencies specialize in
a specific issue or area of the law.61 If Congress has penned an
ambiguous statute, a reviewing court should accept the agency's
interpretation as long as it is reasonable.62 This doctrine is commonly
known as "Chevron deference."63 Relying on the EPA's scientists,
engineers, and lawyers, the D.C. Circuit and other reviewing courts
will not interfere with EPA regulations, as long as the agency has
"acted within its delegated statutory authority, considered all of the
relevant factors, and demonstrated a reasonable connection between
the facts on the record and its decision."64
Deferring to experts is especially crucial for a statute as
"unwieldy and science-driven" as the CAA. 65  For example, in
Appalachia Power Co. v. EPA, a challenging utility company failed to
show that the EPA's regulation of nitrogen oxide emissions was
arbitrary and capricious.66  The company claimed the EPA had
omitted certain variables used in their analysis.67 However, the utility
company could not prove that these additional, unaccounted-for
factors would have a significant effect on nitrogen oxide emissions.68
58. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
59. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
60. See, e.g., Nat'l Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 233 F.3d 625, 640 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Lignite
Energy Council v. EPA, 198 F.3d 930, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
61. See Chevron, U.S., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984);
Appalachia Power Co. v. EPA, 135 F.3d 791, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
62. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
63. See id. For further explanation of Chevron deference, see, for example, Kenneth W.
Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 285-88 (1986).
64. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
65. See Appalachia Power, 135 F.3d at 802.
66. See id. at 797.
67. See id. at 804.
68. See id.
2192014]
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Determining control technology standards required such a high degree
of scientific expertise that the court would hold agency action
arbitrary and capricious "only when the model bears no rational
relationship to the characteristics of the data to which it is applied."69
That deference is not unlimited, however. When the agency's
rationale is inconsistent or scientifically insufficient, arbitrary and
capricious challenges may succeed.70 The court rejected the EPA's
regulation in Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA because their rationale did not
sufficiently address the problem of feasibility.71 First, although the
EPA had relied on a list of other factories that used sulfur burners,
the agency did not analogize those factories to Bunker Hill, rendering
the list "meaningless."72  Second, the EPA's expert testimony
contained internal inconsistencies regarding scientific data, calling
into question the agency's logic. 7 3 Thus, the EPA's decision was not
"an exercise of reasoned discretion," and did not meet the State Farm
test.74
In sum, the EPA must have considered cost, achievability, and
whether the technology has been "adequately demonstrated" to
determine that CCS is the BSER for new coal-fired power plants.75
Failure to appropriately consider all factors could result in the
regulation being set aside as arbitrary and capricious.76 The D.C.
Circuit's explication of these terms appears to grant the EPA
significant leeway in terms of their chosen technology's commercial
status, but as Part II of this Note demonstrates, the New Source Rule
may not be completely insulated from industry challenges.77
C. Forcing CCS Technology: The Proposed Rule
Carbon dioxide is the leading greenhouse gas contributing to
anthropogenic climate change.78 Power plants are a logical first target
for regulating sources of carbon emissions due to their significant
carbon dioxide emissions.79 Under the CAA, Section 111(b), the New
Source Rule applies only to new power plants; a rule for existing
69. See id. at 797, 802.
70. See, e.g., Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1286, 1304 (9th Cir. 1977).
71. See id.
72. Id. at 1297.
73. See id. at 1303.
74. See id. at 1304.
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2012).
76. See discussion infra Part II.B.
77. See infra Part II.
78. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 4, at 4 tbl.ES-1.
79. See id. at 3-1.
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sources was released on June 2, 2014.80 The New Source Rule
establishes a carbon emissions cap at 1,100 pounds of carbon dioxide
per megawatt-hour for new coal-fired plants, and 1,000 pounds per
megawatt-hour for new natural gas-fired plants.8 1 Coal-fired plants
currently emit an average of 1,768 pounds per megawatt-hour.8 2 To
account for the 668-pound difference, the EPA proposes two types of
technology that plants can embrace as a best system of emissions
reduction: either install CCS or adopt natural gas-fueled systems.8 3
CCS purports to reduce carbon emissions by up to 90 percent,84 while
natural gas emits approximately half as much carbon as coal-fired
plants.85
CCS is a three-part process.86 First, capture technologies
separate carbon dioxide from other gases emitted by electricity
generation.87 Second, ships or pipelines transport the captured carbon
to its final storage destination.8 8 Finally, the carbon is injected into
underground geological formations, such as depleted gas and oil
reservoirs or saline aquifers.8 9 CCS's emission reduction potential has
made it a hot topic amongst policymakers and academics for years,90
80. See What EPA Is Doing, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www2.epa.gov/carbon-pollution-standards/what-epa-doing (last updated June 2, 2014). The
CAA, Section 111(b), governs New Sources; Section 111(d) governs Existing Sources. See id.
81. See Standards of Performance, supra note 8, at § I.A.1. This new standard replaces
the older version of the rule, which set the limit at one thousand regardless of the fossil fuel
utilized. See Chemnick, supra note 7.
82. Lenny Bernstein & Juliet Eilperin, EPA Moves to Limit Emissions of Future Coal-
and Gas-Fired Power Plants, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/
2013-09-19/national/42221707_1emissions-new-coal-plant-clean-air-act.
83. See Standards of Performance, supra note 8, at §§ I.B.5-6. The EPA does not
mandate that these specific technologies must be used as part of the rule; rather these types of
technology are the best options for achieving the standard. See id.
84. See id. at § I.B.5.
85. See id. at § I.B.6.
86. What Is CCS?, CARBON CAPTURE & STORAGE ASS'N, http://www.ccsassociation.org/
what-is-ccs/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2014).
87. Capture, CARBON CAPTURE & STORAGE ASS'N, http://www.ccsassociation.org/what-is-
ccs/capture/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2014).
88. Transport, CARBON CAPTURE & STORAGE ASS'N, http://www.ccsassociation.org/what-
is-ccs/transport/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2014).
89. Storage, CARBON CAPTURE & STORAGE ASS'N, http://www.ccsassociation.org/what-is-
ccs/storage/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2014).
90. See, e.g., Nadine R. Hoffman, The Emergence of Carbon Sequestration: An
Introduction and Annotated Bibliography of Legal Aspects for CCS, 29 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 218
(2011); Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change and Carbon Sequestration:
Assessing a Liability Regime for Long-Term Storage of Carbon Dioxide, 58 EMORY L.J. 103
(2008); Will Reisinger et al., Reconciling King Coal and Climate Change: A Regulatory
Framework for Carbon Capture and Storage, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2009).
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but the EPA has only now introduced it as policy.91 Two domestic
plants installing the technology are currently under construction and
are both about 75 percent complete: Kemper County Energy Facility
in Mississippi,9 2 and SaskPower's Boundary Dam in Estevan,
Saskatchewan.93 Summit Power's Texas Clean Energy Project and the
Hydrogen Energy California Project are also incorporating CCS into
their construction; and NRG Energy is developing a commercial-scale
CCS project southwest of Houston, Texas, predicted to operate by
2015.94
Utilities may alternatively choose to fuel their plants with
natural gas to meet the standard.95 Natural gas has experienced a
surge in popularity within the last few decades after the discovery of
vast reserves of the resource.96 Environmentalists prefer it because it
burns cleaner than coal, releasing 45 percent less carbon dioxide.97
Natural gas has been used in the United States since as early as 1821,
which means that scientists have had almost two centuries to develop
the requisite technology.98 More extensive technology also means
cheaper installation and maintenance costs.99 The EPA has
determined that utilities can choose between these two technology
options, but the costs and technological uncertainty of CCS has the
coal industry ready to stop the New Source Rule in its tracks.100
91. See generally EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT'S CLIMATE
ACTION PLAN (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/
president27sclimateactionplan.pdf (introducing the President's climate change policies, which
include CCS).
92. See Kemper FAQ, KEMPERPROJECT.ORG, http://kemperproject.org/kemper-faq/ (last
visited Sept. 24, 2014).
93. See Standards of Performance, supra note 8, at § I.B.3.
94. See id.
95. See id. at § I.B.6.
96. See Robert Lenzner, The Ten Reasons to Love Natural Gas, FORBES (Aug. 21, 2012,
10:25 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertlenzner/2012/08/21/the-exquisite-symmetry-of-the-
natural-gas-revolution/.
97. See Natural Gas and the Environment, NATURALGAS.ORG,
http://www.naturalgas.org/environment/naturalgas (last updated Sept. 20, 2013).
98. See History, NATURALGAS.ORG, http://www.naturalgas.org/overviewhistory (last
updated Sept. 20, 2013).
99. See Chris Nelder, Is Natural Gas the Cheapest Path to Clean Grid Power?, GREEN
TECH MEDIA (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/readlis-natural-gas-the-
cheapest-path-to-clean-grid-power.
100. See Chemnick, supra note 7.
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II. COURTS SHOULD UPHOLD THE NEW SOURCE RULE BECAUSE THE
EPA HAS APPROPRIATELY BALANCED THE CAA FACTORS
Lawyers representing utility companies are already preparing
to litigate the New Source Rule, which imposes undeniably high costs
on their clients.10 1 The CAA's language could be problematic for the
EPA on issues concerning cost and balancing whether CCS is
achievable or adequately demonstrated.102 Because this rule is the
first in history to regulate power plants' carbon emissions, predicting
the Rule's fate is an inexact science.103 However, despite the small
number of aforementioned CCS projects in the United States, the EPA
has met its statutory mandates. Further, Congress has assigned the
task of balancing difficult questions of law, science, and policy to EPA
experts, and a reviewing court should defer to their judgment.104
A. CCS Costs Are Not Exorbitant
Section 111(a)(1) explicitly instructs the EPA to consider the
costs of implementation, but does not provide much guidance on what
cost consideration actually entails or how much weight this factor
plays in the agency's overall BSER determination.0 5 But industry
groups may succeed with an arbitrary and capricious challenge if the
EPA attempts to force a type of technology with costs that are "greater
than the industry could bear and survive"0 6 or "excessive."10 7 For the
New Source Rule, the industry will undoubtedly underscore the costs
of CCS, while the EPA will analogize to prior D.C. Circuit case law
holding in its favor.
The coal industry has accused the Obama administration of
declaring a "war on coal" with the New Source Rule. 08 But because
101. See id.
102. See Clean Air Act § 111(a)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2012).
103. See Carbon Pollution Standards: What EPA Is Doing, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/carbon-pollution-standards/what-epa-doing (last updated Oct. 28,
2014).
104. See Wendy Wagner, The "Bad Science" Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate over the
Role of Science in Public Health and Environmental Regulation, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 63, 81, 85-86 (2003), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edulcgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article= 1296&context=lcp.
105. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1).
106. See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Train, 513 F.2d 506, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
107. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
108. Dan Ferber, Coal Plants Are Victims of Their Own Economics, SCIENCE (Feb. 18,
2013, 11:48 AM), http://news.sciencemag.org/2013/02/coal-plants-are-victims-their-own-
economics; see Chemnick, supra note 7.
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CCS technology is new, it is expensive.109  A new plant in
Edwardsport, Indiana, has been described as "capture-ready," but does
not plan on installing CCS because of its $380 million price tag, which
does not include ongoing storage costs.110 The average coal-fired
power plant reaps over $4 billion in average annual profits, down from
$20 billion since the emergence of natural gas. Consequently,
installation costs would be about 10.5 percent of one year's profits.'
However, that figure could be much higher. For example, the Kemper
County facility has experienced a plethora of budget and scheduling
issues related to their installation project.112 The projected cost is now
at $5.5 billion, more than double the initial estimate.113  Some
setbacks were out of the company's control, such as bad weather or
contractor and supplier delays.1 14 Others were due to miscalculating
pipe length, thickness, or quantity.115 Regardless of the reasons, the
high costs do not bode well for the EPA's heavy reliance on the
plant.116
Trade organizations have also characterized the proposal as an
impermissible "de-facto fuel-switching mandate" by imposing such
costs on the coal industry.117 Because natural gas generation has been
commercially deployed, it is perceptibly cheaper and commercially
demonstrated.1 1 8 Coal states' comments on the proposal emphasized
the larger negative economic impacts of the rule, including increasing
109. See Wendy Koch, EPA Proposes Strict Emission Limits on New Power Plants, USA
TODAY, Sept. 20, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/19/epa-limits-
emissions-coal-power-plants-carbon-capture-technology/2838391/.
110. See Matthew L. Wald, With Natural Gas Plentiful and Cheap, Carbon Capture
Projects Stumble, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/19/business/
energy-environment/low-natural-gas-prices-threaten-carbon-capture-projects.html?_r=0.
1l1. See Ferber, supra note 108.
112. See Steven Mufson, Intended Showcase of Clean-Coal Future Hits Snags,





115. See Kemper County IGCC Fact Sheet: Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage Project,
MASS. INST. OF TECH., https://sequestration.mit.edultools/projects/kemper.html (last modified
Nov. 19, 2014).
116. See Mufson, supra note 112.
117. See Marlo Lewis, EPA's Carbon "Pollution" Rules: War on Coal by the Numbers,
GLOBALWARMING.ORG (June 9, 2014), http://www.globalwarming.org/2014/06/09/epas-carbon-
pollution-rules-war-on-coal-by-the-numbers/; see also NMA CEO Says EPA's Power Plant Rule
Gambles with the Economy, PA. COAL ALLIANCE (Sept. 20, 2013, 12:18 PM),
http://www.pacoalalliance.com/nma-ceo-says-epas-power-plant-rule-gambles-with-the-economy/
("By forcing power plants to abandon the use of the nation's largest and most reliable source of
affordable electricity, EPA is recklessly gambling with the nation's energy and economic future."
(quoting National Mining Association President and CEO Hall Quinn)).
118. See Lewis, supra note 117.
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unemployment and fluctuating utility prices passed on to
consumers.1 19 The natural gas market has experienced price volatility
in the past, and if prices continue to swing violently, it would affect
consumers' electricity bills.120 Despite the EPA's findings that the new
standard will not create significant economic impacts on utilities1 21 or
on customers,122 coal companies are armed with conflicting data to
argue otherwise.123
If the industry can prove that CCS costs are "exorbitant," then
the EPA has arbitrarily and capriciously failed to consider costs.12 4 To
demonstrate this, however, coal plants will probably have to show that
CCS costs are so excessive that it is financially prudent to cease
operations completely.125 For example, in Bunker Hill, a power plant
successfully challenged an EPA determination because the plan
"seriously risk[ed] closing down" the plant, making the regulation
economically infeasible.126  Theoretically, new smaller coal plants
could more easily prove such a claim, but energy sector modeling
predicts that few, if any, new coal-fired power plants will be built in
the next decade.127
When facing such challenges, the EPA has an abundance of
case law on its side. No D.C. Circuit decision under Section 111 of the
119. See Abby L. Harvey, EPA Receives More Than One Million Comments on NSPS,
GHG MONITOR (ExchangeMonitor Publ'ns & Forums, Inc., Wash., D.C.), May 16, 2014, available
at http://www.exchangemonitor.com/PDFs/GHG-vol-9-no-19.pdf.
120. See Standards of Performance, supra note 8, at § II.C.2.a. This finding was based on
a combination of US Energy Information Administration (EIA) power sector modeling
projections, EPA power sector modeling projections, electric utility integrated resource planning
documents, and projected new power plants reported by the industry to EIA. See U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, EPA-452/R-13-003, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED
STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FOR NEW STATIONARY SOURCES:
ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING UNITS 5-1 (2013), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttnecasl/
regdataRIAs/EGUGHGNewSourceStandardsRIA.pdf.
121. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 120, at 5-50 (explaining that the ability
to sell captured carbon for enhanced oil recovery operations is one of the many reasons the costs
are not exorbitant for utilities).
122. See id. at 4-31 (explaining that, while natural gas prices have been historically
volatile, prices are predicted to stay relatively steady due to the discovery of vast reserves of
shale gas and improvements in drilling techniques).
123. See Chemnick, supra note 7.
124. See, e.g., Lignite Energy Council v. EPA, 198 F.3d 930, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Essex
Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
125. See, e.g., Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1286, 1301 (9th Cir. 1977).
126. See id. Under State Implementation Plan (SIP) provisions, states develop their own
plans to implement new NAAQs, and the EPA must approve or disapprove the plan. Here, the
EPA rejected a SIP and the resulting program was at issue. See State Implementation Plan
Overview, U.S. ENvTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/oar/urbanair/sipstatus/
overview.html (last updated Mar. 27, 2012).
127. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 120, at 5-1.
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CAA has invalidated a standard because it was too costly.12 8 Rather,
the court has upheld standards that have entailed high costs, even
those that consumers may ultimately bear.129  For instance, the
Portland Cement v. Ruckelshaus court upheld a standard that
accounted for 5-7 percent of plants' operating costs, and the Sierra
Club v. Costle court upheld a standard that imposed "tens of billions of
dollars" on the industry, which utilities were likely to pass on to
consumers.130
The New Source Rule is undeniably weakened by the dearth of
commercial-scale CCS projects, but the costs it imposes should be
upheld under the D.C. Circuit's precedent.'13 The New Source Rule
could be in trouble if facilities continue to face budget difficulties on
par with the Kemper County plant.132 However, CCS costs will almost
certainly decrease as the technology becomes more widely used and
developed, decreasing the likelihood that future projects will face the
difficulties of Kemper County.133 The EPA has made a "reasonable"
forecast in line with the standard set forth in Portland Cement v.
Ruckelshaus.134 The price of an analogous technology-the sulfur
dioxide scrubber, which the coal industry similarly adopted due to
CAA demands-has fallen by 30 percent since its initial adoption in
the 1990s, a result of technological innovation and investment.135
Although the proposed rule does not contain specific CCS
implementation cost estimates, an Energy Information Administration
(EIA) study from 2010 predicts that operating and maintenance costs
for coal-fired plants with CCS will average approximately $36 million
per year, a fraction of a plant's annual profits.136 The fact that several
128. See Standards of Performance, supra note 8, at § VI.D.2.a.ii. State Implementation
Plans are a separate program under the CAA. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012).
129. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 313 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Portland Cement
Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 387-88 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
130. Costle, 657 F.2d at 313; see Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 387-88.
131. See Costle, 657 F.2d at 410.
132. See Mufson, supra note 112.
133. See Standards of Performance, supra note 8, at § VII.F.5.c.
134. See Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 391.
135. See DALLAS BURTRAW, COST SAVINGS SANS ALLOWANCE TRADES? EVALUATING THE
S02 EMISSION TRADING PROGRAM TO DATE 13 (Res. For the Future, Discussion Paper 95-30-REV,
1996), available at http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-95-30-REV.pdforigin=
publication-detail; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-452/F-03-034, AIR POLLUTION CONTROL
TECHNOLOGY FACT SHEET: FLUE GAS DESULFURIZATION 2, available at http://www.epa.gov/
ttncatc1/dir1/ffdg.pdf.
136. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, UPDATED CAPITAL COST
ESTIMATES FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION PLANTS 7 (2010), available at http://www.eia.gov/oiafl
beck-plantcosts/pdf/updatedplantcosts.pdf. These costs are reflected in US 2010 dollars. The $36
million figure was reached by multiplying the nominal capacity by the O&M costs of coal-fired
Single Unit IGCC plants with CCS. See id.
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new coal-fired plants are incorporating CCS into their construction
further demonstrates that the system is not unduly expensive.137
The EPA has additionally predicted that nearly all projected
electricity generating units will switch to natural gas in the future.138
Coal-fired power plants have been on the decline for years. Since the
mid-2000s, over 150 new plant construction plans have been canceled,
many existing plants have closed due to increasing compliance costs,
and in 2012 only one new coal-fired plant was built.'3 9 The EIA's 2013
Annual Energy Outlook reported only a modest number of planned
coal-fired power plants, indicating that most future plants will utilize
natural gas rather than coal.140  Furthermore, due to worldwide
policies pushing for cleaner energy sources, every other energy source
has grown faster than coal, excluding liquids.141 Although precise
predictions of future natural gas prices are not possible, advances in
hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling techniques contribute to
EIA's predictions that natural gas prices will remain relatively
constant and thus continuously inexpensive for consumers.142 These
predictions are based on carefully developed modeling systems and the
industry's own documents and projections.143
Finally, the EPA has suggested that facilities can sell captured
carbon to generate supplementary revenue.144 Enhanced oil recovery
operations are one potential market for captured carbon.145  Oil
extractors have been using this technique for over forty years, because
injecting carbon dioxide into reservoirs decreases oil viscosity and
improves its flow rate, allowing for easier extraction.146 The few CCS
projects currently under development intend to employ this
suggestion.147  Additionally, companies have recently experimented
with technology that can recycle captured carbon into baking soda,
137. See Standards of Performance, supra note 8, at § I.B.3.
138. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 120, at 5-4.
139. See Ferber, supra note 108.
140. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0383(2013),
ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013, at 41 (2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/
archivelaeol3/pdfl0383(2013).pdf.
141. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0484(2013),
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013, at 67 (2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/
ieo/pdf/0484%282013%29.pdf.
142. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 120, at 4-31.
143. See id. at 5-1.
144. See Standards of Performance, supra note 8, at § VII.F.5.a.
145. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 120, at 5-29.
146. See Enhanced Oil Recovery, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/fe/science-
innovation/oil-gas/enhanced-oil-recovery (last visited June 29, 2014).
147. See Standards of Performance, supra note 8, at § VII.H.1.
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bleach,148 and omega-3 oils.14 9 Although the amount of revenue these
strategies could generate is still uncertain, selling or recycling
captured carbon could offset the cost of installation and maintenance,
weakening arguments that the cost is "greater than the industry could
bear and survive."150
With ample EIA-backed studies to show the reasonableness of
its cost predictions51 and an abundance of case law in the EPA's
favor,152 a reviewing court should not hold the New Source Rule
arbitrary or capricious because of costs. But because CCS is not yet
widely available, a court may find that there is insufficient literature
to conclude the costs are not "exorbitant." Although the next Section
also argues that the EPA has sufficient data to satisfy the achievable
and "adequately demonstrated" prongs of the BSER definition, the
shortage of CCS projects is the weakest aspect of the New Source
Rule.
B. The EPA Has Provided Sufficient Data to Show That CCS Is
"Adequately Demonstrated"
Because so few projects are currently underway in the United
States, none of which are complete,153 the agency may be skating on
thin ice when it comes to demonstrating that CCS is achievable and
adequately demonstrated.1 5 4 Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit permits the
EPA to make reasonable predictions based on current technology, and
the EPA's data is likely sufficient to show that the technology can be
achieved in the near future.155 To survive the industry's attack, the
agency will have to prove that the data underlying their predictions
about technological feasibility are reliable and scientifically sound.156
148. See Katherine Ling, DOE-Backed Project Turning Texas Plant's C02 Into Baking
Soda, Bleach, GREENWIRE (Oct. 22, 2014), available at http://www.eenews.net/
greenwire/2014/10/22/stories/1060007729.
149. See Amanda Peterka, Startup Trumpets Technology That Turns C02 Into Fish Oil,
GREENWIRE (Nov. 4, 2014), available at http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2014/11/04/
stories/1060008349.
150. See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Train, 513 F.2d 506, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
151. See Standards of Performance, supra note 8, at § VII.F; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
supra note 140.
152. See, e.g., Lignite Energy Council v. EPA, 198 F.3d 930, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per
curiam); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 387-88 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
153. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
154. See Chemnick, supra note 7.
155. See id.; Lignite Energy, 198 F.3d at 934.
156. See, e.g., Nat'l Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 430 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Bunker Hill
Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1286, 1304 (9th Cir. 1977).
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If the coal industry can discredit the adequacy of the EPA's
underlying data, it could successfully challenge the regulation.157 For
example, the EPA's regulation in Bunker Hill was arbitrary and
capricious because they relied on inadequate data.15 8 There, the EPA
required Idaho's power plants to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions by 82
percent, which would have required the use of new technology-sulfur
burners.159 For the plan to be deemed economically and
technologically feasible, the EPA either had to point to "contemporary
examples of sulfur burners being used to cure a similar problem in a
similar context," or to rely on expert testimony to show that present
technology could solve the power plant's problem.160 The agency's
decision was held as arbitrary and capricious because they failed to
demonstrate either of these findings.161
The court has reproached the EPA when it relies on test data
showing that the standard is not continuously achievable, but
typically upholds the rules anyway. For example, in both Portland
Cement v. Ruckelshaus and Essex Chemical, the court expressed
concern that the plants could not achieve the standards during periods
of abnormal operation (e.g., startup, shutdown, and equipment
malfunctions).1 6 2 However, both regulations were upheld.163 Courts
have also "questioned the significance" of tests on which the EPA has
relied when testing conditions are different from conditions required
under regulation.164 For instance, in Essex Chemical, the EPA relied
on test data from US plants operating at 52 percent capacity and
European plants operating at an unknown capacity, but the
regulations mandated that the regulated entities must monitor
themselves at full capacity.165 Likewise, in National Lime v. EPA, the
EPA failed to demonstrate that the testing data on which it relied for
rule promulgation was representative of the entire industry-the EPA
157. See Nat'l Lime, 627 F.2d at 430 ("Promulgation of standards based upon inadequate
proof of achievability would defy the Administrative Procedure Act's mandate against action that
is 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."').
158. Bunker Hill, 572 F.2d at 1291. This case involves a different CAA provision-the
SIP program. This section does not specifically use the word "feasible," but D.C. Circuit case law
has inteipreted this section to require "the highest emission control level that is technologically
and economically feasible." Id. at 1293 (citing Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60
(1975)).
159. See id. at 1291.
160. See id. at 1294.
161. See id.
162. See Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Portland
Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 398-99 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
163. See Essex Chem., 486 F.2d at 433; Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 398-99.
164. See Nat'1 Lime, 627 F.2d at 430.
165. See Essex Chem., 486 F.2d at 436; see also 40 C.F.R. § 60.85(b) (2014).
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did not adequately show that its testing data "reflects consideration of
the range of relevant variables that may affect emissions in different
plants."166 However, the court upheld the EPA's regulations in both of
these cases despite its misgivings about the underlying literature.167
Judges are reluctant to question the adequacy of the EPA's
studies, due partially to the EPA's ability to make reasonable
projections about the future and to balance the various Section
111(a)(1) factors.168 In Sierra Club v. Costle, the D.C. Circuit upheld a
Section 111 regulation requiring a 90 percent median reduction in
sulfur dioxide despite the fact that no data on the record showed that
the standard had actually been achieved continuously by any facility
operating at the time of the rule's promulgation.169 There, challenging
lime and limestone system-based utility companies could only meet
the standard by installing flue gas desulfurization (FGD), a new
technology at the time.170 The agency predicted that the standard was
achievable based on a combination of projected well-designed future
plants and existing plants: the very few US limestone facilities that
employed FGD technology and that almost met the standard, US
non-limestone systems achieving the 90 percent standard by
employing FGD technology, and Japanese facilities that employed
FGD technology and met the standard.171 The court noted that none
of these data sources alone would have sufficed for the EPA to show
that the standard was achievable or "adequately demonstrated."172
But the court recognized the CAA's technology-forcing purpose,
maintained the EPA's authority to "hold the industry to a standard of
improved design and operational advances," and upheld the
regulation.173
The D.C. Circuit has also held that a technology is "achievable"
if the EPA reasonably projects based on existing technology that it will
be widely available in the future.174 The court has upheld prior NSPS
166. See Nat'l Lime, 627 F.2d at 433.
167. See id.; Essex Chem., 486 F.2d at 436.
168. See Lignite Energy Council v. EPA, 198 F.3d 930, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam);
Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 387-88.
169. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 356 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
170. See id. at 324.
171. See id. at 362.
172. See id. at 362-63 ("The Electric Utilities argue and we are inclined to agree that
[data based on non-lime systems] is not conclusive since EPA specified that the standards were
based on lime or limestone systems, and not the more expensive and less available regenerative
systems, or systems using reagents and additives more reactive than lime. . . . Thus we cannot
accept EPA's 92 percent median solely on the basis of evidence that only one commercial scale
plant and one small pilot unit can almost but not quite meet the standard.").
173. See id. at 364.
174. See Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 387-88 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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regulations that were difficult to achieve, such as the regulation in
Essex Chemical that the challenging plant could only achieve three
times out of nineteen.175 Additionally, the Senate Report on this
section indicated that the technology was not required to be "in actual
routine use somewhere,"176 and the House Report specified that a
technology is deemed achievable as long as it is not "a purely
theoretical or experimental means of preventing or controlling air
pollution."177
CCS appears to meet these requirements. Although it is not
"in actual routine use" yet, the technology is not purely theoretical or
experimental-two coal-fired domestic CCS projects are over 75
percent complete, and two other facilities have begun incorporating
CCS into their construction.178  Additionally, four commercial
coal-fired CCS facilities exist in other countries,179  other
demonstration projects are underway in the United States and other
countries,180 and ongoing research on geologic sequestration
demonstrates promising and safe future prospects.181 Finally, carbon
injection has been used for over forty years as part of enhanced oil
recovery techniques, demonstrating the technology's feasibility.182
With this data, the EPA has reasonably predicted, based on
"adequately demonstrated" existing technology, that the standard is
"achievable" through CCS.183
The EPA likewise reasons that it has made reasonable
predictions based on existing technology in the United States and
abroad.18 4 In the proposal, the EPA cites a number of studies that all
175. See Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
176. See Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 391 (quoting S. REP. NO. 9-1196 (1970)).
177. See H. REP. NO. 91-1146, at 5365 (1970).
178. See Standards of Performance, supra note 8, at § I.B.3.
179. See Sleipner C02 Injection, GLOBAL CCS INSTITUTE,
http://www.globalccsinstitute.com/project/sleipnerC2%Aco2-injection (last updated Sept. 7,
2014) (located in the North Sea); Sohoit C02 Injection, GLOBAL CCS INSTITUTE,
http://www.globalccsinstitute.com/project/snC3%B8hvit-co2-injection (last updated Sept. 7,
2014) (located in Barents Sea); Gas Production at In Salah, IN SALAH GAS,
http://www.insalahco2.com/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2014) (located in Algeria); Weyburn-Midale Fact
Sheet: Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage Project, MASS. INST. OF TECH.,
http://sequestration.mit.edu/tools/projects/weyburn.html (last modified Dec. 19, 2013) (located in
Canada).
180. See Projects, GLOBAL CCS INSTITUTE, http://www.globalcesinstitute.com/
projects/browse (last visited Nov. 12, 2014).
181. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON
CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE 9 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/
Downloads/ccs/CCS-Task-Force-Report-2010.pdf (highlighting that the four international
projects have demonstrated safe and reliable capture and storage).
182. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
183. See Standards of Performance, supra note 8, at § I.B.3.
184. See id.
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conclude there are no "insurmountable technological, legal,
institutional, regulatory or other barriers that prevent CCS from
playing a role in reducing GHG emissions."185 Although none of the
previously cited facilities in the United States have deployed the
entire CCS process yet, each of the individual steps (capture,
transport, and storage) have been implemented on a commercial scale
in some capacity.186  Across the world, thirty-seven projects are
currently deploying both capture and injection.187 Unless the industry
can uncover serious flaws in the EPA's studies, a reviewing court
should follow Sierra Club v. Costle, and hold that the combination of
existing domestic and foreign technology and projected future projects
are sufficient to demonstrate that CCS is achievable and adequately
demonstrated, despite the fact that no US facility has employed it
commercially as of now. 88
To summarize, industry groups have succeeded with arbitrary
and capricious challenges by showing flaws in EPA's data or
reasoning,189 but no industry arbitrary and capricious challenge under
NSPS provisions of the CAA has ever succeeded.190 A reviewing court
should follow these precedents when evaluating a coal-backed
arbitrary and capricious challenge, holding that the EPA's data
reasonably predicts that CCS is achievable and adequately
demonstrated. Unfortunately for the EPA, this will not be the last
185. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 181, at 7; see J.J. DOOLEY ET AL., U.S. DEP'T
OF ENERGY, PNNL-18520, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMERCIAL AVAILABILITY OF CARBON
DIOXIDE CAPTURE AND STORAGE TECHNOLOGIES AS OF JUNE 2009 (2009), available at
http://www.pnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical-reports/PNNL-18520.pdf.
186. See, e.g., NETL's Carbon Capture, Utilization, & Storage Database-Ver. 4, U.S.
DEP'T OF ENERGY, http://www.netl.doe.gov/research/coal/carbon-storage/cs-global/database/ (last
visited July 1, 2014).
187. See id.
188. Cf. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 313 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
189. See, e.g., Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1286, 1304 (9th Cir. 1977).
190. See, e.g., Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 912 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding
that EPA's refusal to compare "representative" pre-renovation and "actual" post-renovation
emissions, to determine whether the plant was subject to new source performance standards,
was not arbitrary and capricious); Puerto Rican Cement Co. v. EPA, 889 F.2d 292, 296 (1st Cir.
1989) (holding that EPA's comparison of actual, historical emissions with potential future
emissions was not arbitrary and capricious); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. EPA, 650 F.2d 509, 520
(4th Cir. 1981) (holding that, despite two flaws in reasoning, a regional administrator's denial of
an exemption was not arbitrary and capricious because correcting the flaws did not change the
ultimate result); Nat'l Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Train, 539 F.2d 775, 784-86 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(holding that EPA's determination that constructing new plants would "significantly contribute"
to future air pollution was not arbitrary and capricious because it properly weighed rate of
emissions, state and local regulations, and "the number of existing plants"); Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc. v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905, 917 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that EPA's approval of Arizona's
scheme for "new and modified sources of pollution" was not arbitrary and capricious).
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industry-backed challenge the agency will expend its limited resources
defending.
III. DOES THE COAL INDUSTRY HAVE A BETTER IDEA?:
SOLUTION-BASED INFORMAL RULEMAKING
To avoid costly regulations, industry groups frequently utilize
science-based arbitrary and capricious litigation9 1 to achieve a
remand, forcing the EPA to rethink their regulations. Considering
recent national political shifts, this could prove to be a highly effective
strategy for industry groups.192 Additionally, regulatory reform laws,
such as the Data Quality Act, provide interest groups with a tool to
delay rule finalization.19 3 Rather than merely attempting to postpone
impending regulations, interest groups should instead affirmatively
propose their own solutions, accounting for the same factors that
Congress has mandated the EPA to consider. When it comes to the
New Source Rule, the coal industry will assuredly litigate and possibly
utilize a Data Quality Act petition to delay the process.194 Perhaps the
coal industry is correct; if all facilities face troubles similar to Kemper
County, CCS may not be the best system of emissions reduction for
coal-fired plants after all. 196 Legislation amending the APA could
allow the industry to suggest an alternative best system of emissions
reductions rather than resist the potential solution and continue
emitting as usual.
A. Regulated Entities' Current Role in the Rulemaking Process
The traditional notice-and-comment process allows any
interested party to comment after a notice of proposed rulemaking is
published in the Federal Register.196 Although any interested person
191. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 135 F.3d 791, 801-02 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(analyzing whether EPA's use of a specific modeling technique was arbitrary and capricious);
Nat'l Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 431-33 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding an EPA regulation as
arbitrary and capricious because the agency failed to account for certain scientific data).
192. See, e.g., Evan Lehmann & Nathanael Massey, New Republican Congress
May Challenge Obama's Climate Rule, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Nov. 5, 2014),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/new-republican-congress-may-challenge-obama-s-
climate-rule/.
193. See Chris Mooney, Thanks to a Little-Known Piece of Legislation, Scientists at the
EPA and Other Agencies Find Their Work Questioned Not Only by Industry, But by Their Own
Government, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 28, 2005, http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/
2005/08/28/interrogations/?page=full.
194. See Chemnick, supra note 10.
195. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
196. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
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may submit "written data, views, or arguments,"1 97 interest groups
tend to dominate the comment process.19 8 The agency proposing
the rule then must "consider[ . . . the relevant matter presented" and
promulgate a final rule.199
Despite the seemingly participatory process, scholars have
critiqued the informal rulemaking process for its adversarial nature,
noting that parties rarely use the opportunity for legitimate problem
solving.200 Furthermore, both industry and environmentalist groups
have an equal opportunity to submit written comments.201 This often
leaves the EPA forced to propose a compromise between two opposite
ends of the policy spectrum, typically leaving both groups unsatisfied
and ready to litigate after the rule has been finalized.202
In addition to litigation, interest groups may utilize regulatory
reform laws such as the Data Quality Act to slow the rulemaking
process.203 This law was passed as part of an appropriations rider,
and many members of Congress were not even aware of its
existence.204 It requires agencies to follow up on petitions for "the
correction of information" such as scientific data, effectively allowing
interest groups to play the role of peer reviewer.205 Although the
purpose of the Data Quality Act was to improve the quality of
information underlying agency regulations, it threatens regulatory
gridlock by adding superfluous data requirements.206 A government
watchdog group, the Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, has already
taken initial steps that suggest they may attempt to challenge the
New Source Rule's scientific studies through this Act.207
Administrative processes meant to encourage constructive
debate do exist, however. Instead of traditional, adversarial
notice-and-comment rulemaking, agencies may choose to engage in
197. Id.
198. See Dorit Rubenstein Reiss, Tailored Participation: Modernizing the APA
Rulemaking Procedures, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 321, 332 (2009).
199. § 553(c)-(d).
200. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1, 11 n.28 (1997).
201. See § 553(c) ("[T]he agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to
participate. . .. ").
202. See Freeman, supra note 200, at 19.
203. See Mooney, supra note 193.
204. See Wagner, supra note 104, at 68 n.24.
205. See id. at 69.
206. Cf. id. at 81, 86-87.
207. See Chemnick, supra note 10.
234 [Vol. 17:1:211
GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATIONS
"negotiated rulemaking."208  This optional process is meant to
facilitate compromise between agencies and regulated entities.209
During negotiated rulemaking, a committee comprised of affected
organizations' representatives negotiates in person with the agency,
which is overseen by a neutral "convenor."210 The final rule then
memorializes the consensus the parties have reached.211 This process
is now codified as an amendment o the APA, 212 and was proposed to
expedite the rulemaking process and to reduce subsequent
litigation.213
Informal rulemaking almost always leads to time-consuming
litigation, and laws like the Data Quality Act can clog the regulatory
process and prevent rule finalization. Asking interest groups to
submit their own solutions through modified informal rulemaking
builds on the policy goals of negotiated rulemaking-it would reduce
regulatory gridlock and provide interest groups with an opportunity to
contribute meaningfully instead of merely blocking the inevitable.214
B. Incorporating Solution-Based Proposals into Informal Rulemaking
Submitting solution-based comments during informal
rulemaking would allow interested parties and the EPA to
cooperatively achieve a BSER determination. Under an amended
notice-and-comment process, interested parties could comment as they
do today by presenting their own studies, arguments, and suggested
changes to the rule.2 1 5 By taking this approach, judicial review would
also work the same way; interest groups could challenge a final rule as
arbitrary and capricious, but the deferential standard of review would
continue to favor agencies' well-reasoned decisions.216
Alternatively, interested parties could propose an entirely new
solution to the regulatory problem-a different type of control
technology than CCS, for instance. Parties would be beholden to the
same congressionally-mandated factors as the EPA, meaning for a
208. See, e.g., AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., WHAT IS NEGOTIATED
RULEMAKING? 1, available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSvl.O/getfile?dDocName=
STELPRDC5089434.
209. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of
Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1261-62 (1997).
210. See AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., supra note 208, at 3.
211. See Coglianese, supra note 209, at 1257.
212. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (2012).
213. See Coglianese, supra note 209, at 1257; Derek R. McDonald, Judicial Review of
Negotiated Rulemaking, 12 REV. LITIG. 467, 468 (1993).
214. See Coglianese, supra note 209, at 1264-66.
215. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
216. See Chevron, U.S., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
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NSPS, the industry or environmental group would have to
appropriately balance costs, achievability, "nonair quality health and
environmental impact[s]," and energy requirements.2 17 They would
also have to provide sufficient data to justify why their solution is
feasible, as the EPA does when it promulgates a rule.2 18 If the parties
fail to appropriately consider the CAA's factors or provide adequate
justifications, then the EPA could reasonably reject the proposal, and
judges would continue to defer to the EPA's judgment.219 But if
parties present a truly workable solution and the EPA ignores their
suggestions, it could hurt the agency during judicial review.220 By
failing to consider a practicable alternative, the EPA would have
"entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem," and
like State Farm, the agency's decision would be set aside as arbitrary
and capricious.221
Under this approach, incentives must exist to ensure that
parties actually submit solutions rather than mere comments.
Requiring solutions as a prerequisite to a successive arbitrary and
capricious challenge is probably the most effective way to guarantee
solution submissions, but it could also create perverse incentives. For
instance, industry or environmentalist groups may propose
perfunctory solutions merely to pass the procedural barrier, allowing
them to litigate later. Additionally, requiring solutions as a litigation
prerequisite would directly contradict the APA, Section 553(c), which
currently requires agencies to give any "interested person the right to
petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule."2 22
Instead, those parties that submit the most feasible solutions
should be rewarded. To properly encourage interest groups to submit
quality solutions, courts must play a gatekeeping role. Before an
agency's rule can be struck down as arbitrary and capricious, the
interest group challenging the rule should be required to prove that
they submitted a viable, feasible solution.223 This type of proof would
correspond with most modern environmental lawsuits, where judges
217. 42 U.S.C. §7411(a)(1) (2012).




221. See id. at 43, 46.
222. 5 U.S.C § 553(c) (2012).
223. If a challenging party chooses not to submit a solution-based comment, they will
have to contend with Chevron, which defers to agency's well-reasoned decisions. Choosing not to
submit a solution may be a viable strategy if the party has a strong argument that the agency
acted in direct contradiction to a textually clear statute, because then the reviewing court "must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Chevron, U.S., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
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frequently decide based on the adequacy and completeness of each
side's reasoning.224  If an interest group cannot prove that their
solution is feasible, then judges should continue to defer to the EPA's
judgment.2 25  But if an interest group submits a truly workable
solution and the EPA did not incorporate it into the final rule, State
Farm cuts against the agency.226
Solution-based informal rulemaking raises another policy
concern though. The process would likely motivate interest groups to
tailor scientific studies to their favor when proposing potential
technology-based solutions.227 This would force judges, who generally
lack scientific training,228 to determine the more feasible solution
based on potentially conflicting scientific data. They may not be in the
best position to decide whether an industry or environmental group's
commissioned study is truly impartial, or whether the data has been
skewed more favorably toward the party proposing the solution.229
However, judges often rule on the adequacy of scientific data in
arbitrary and capricious challenges; their final decisions hinge on
whether the information presented is complete and well-reasoned.230
With solution-based comments, judges should continue to pay careful
attention to the quality of each side's data, and should be particularly
skeptical of studies that have been commissioned by industry or
environmentalist groups. Having untrained judges making the final
call is admittedly not ideal.231 However, solution-based informal
rulemaking would encourage multiple perspectives both inside and
outside the courtroom, and is therefore superior to the current state of
regulatory impasse.
One final obstacle to this solution is that it would require
amending the APA. 2 3 2 Legislative fixes, especially those connected to
224. See supra Part II.B.
225. See supra Part II.B.
226. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 43.
227. See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Our Science Is Sound Science and Their Science Is
Junk Science: Science-Based Strategies for Avoiding Accountability and Responsibility for Risk-
Producing Products and Activities, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 897, 901 (2004) (arguing that risk-
producing regulated entities rely on science that "is a strategically manipulated caricature of the
scientific process in which perception, not objective truth, is the primary goal").
228. See Justice Stephen Breyer, Science in the Courtroom, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH.,
Summer 2000, available at http://issues.org/16-4/breyer/ ("A judge is not a scientist, and a
courtroom is not a scientific laboratory.").
229. See Wagner, supra note 104, at 96-97 ("Moreover, in contrast to the agencies, judges
have neither the information nor the expertise to competently adjudicate challenges to the
quality of agency science.").
230. See supra Part II.B.
231. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 104, at 96-97.
232. A similar process (negotiated rulemaking) was codified as an APA amendment in
1990. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (2012).
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major statutes like the APA, are unlikely in the current political
climate.233 Although this solution may not be immediately feasible,
future litigious interest groups may frustrate regulations to the point
of amendment necessity.2 34
IV. CONCLUSION
As the rulemaking process works today, interest groups'
challenges prevent the EPA from completing their congressionally
mandated regulatory tasks. In the case of the New Source Rule, the
coal industry is dissatisfied with the EPA's determinations, and will
demand the agency to come up with a more cost-efficient and
feasible solution than CCS. But if the coal industry were asked to
come up with its own solutions, could it do a better job? Although
incorporating solution-based comments into informal rulemaking
entails some obstacles, it would move environmental regulations
forward, stimulate meaningful debate, and give interest groups a
significant voice in rulemaking.
Lorraine J. Baer*
233. See Derek Willis, A Do-Nothing Congress? Well, Pretty Close, N.Y. TIMES
(May 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/upshot/a-do-nothing-congress-well-pretty-
close.html?r=0.
234. See Mooney, supra note 193.
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